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Abstract 
Non-executive director (NED) compensation has not been addressed in detail in prior studies. 
Accordingly, we examine the economic and director-specific determinants of NED 
compensation in the Australian setting. We find that NED compensation is associated with: 
firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. It is also associated with director reputation, 
experience, connectedness and the directors’ involvement with the firm. The additional 
compensation paid to the chairperson is positively associated with their prior experience and 
negatively associated with NED reputation and involvement. We find inconclusive evidence 
on the association between changes in NED compensation and firm performance. 
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1 Introduction 
The corporate governance literature has extensively examined the influence of board 
independence on various corporate phenomena.1 However, little attention has been given to 
the compensation of non-executive directors (NEDs). The limited research on NEDs’ 
compensation is U.S. dominated, uses small sample sizes and has primarily focused on firm 
rather than director-specific characteristics as determinants of NEDs’ compensation 
(Cordeiro, 2000 et al; Ryan Jr and Wiggins III 2004; Yermack 2004). This gap in the 
literature is curious given that aggregate NED compensation is typically greater than CEO 
compensation and NEDs often constitute the majority of boards. For example in Australia, 
the aggregate compensation of NEDs is on average 36% higher than the CEOs’ 
compensation,2 and on average NEDs constitute 67% of a board (Monem and Ng, 2013). 
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are: i) to provide evidence on the economic and 
other determinants of the levels and changes in NEDs and chairperson compensation and ii) 
to examine the association between changes in NEDs’ compensation and firm performance. 
The motivation for this study is twofold. First, NEDs act as independent representatives of 
shareholders (Williamson, 1984; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and their primary role is to reduce 
agency costs by monitoring and advising senior management including the CEO (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Armstrong et al., 2010). Fama and Jensen (1983, p 315) argue, that NEDs are 
typically ‘managers of other corporations and/or important decision agents of other complex 
organisations’ who use their directorships to signal their decision making expertise. 
Furthermore, they suggest that this signal is most credible when payments to outside directors 
are small and directors are motivated to perform their monitoring role by developing a 
reputation as an effective monitor of management (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). Directors who 
build such a reputation are expected to be rewarded with additional future directorships 
(Fama, 1980).  
However, over the last two decades or so, the role of NEDs has substantially changed due to 
a number of institutional and regulatory changes. First, in the early 2000s many stock 
                                                 
1 Examples include Weisbach, (1988); Rosenstein and Wyatt, (1990); Dechow et al., (1996); Beasley, (1996); 
Larcker et al., (2007); Masulis et al., (2012). 
2 All Australian compensation and governance data used in this paper are extracted from the Thomson Reuters 
Connect 4 Boardroom database for the period 2004 to 2012. 
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exchanges and/or regulators recommended and/or required that the majority of the board of 
directors be NEDs and that at least the audit committee of the board be made up of NEDs.3 
Second, in the last two decades in Australia, a number of important court judgements have 
been handed down which confirm that the fiduciary duties of NEDs are similar to those of 
executive directors (Lucy 2006). It is our contention, that in today’s institutional and 
regulatory environment, NED compensation does matter and it is driven not only by 
increased demand for NEDs, but by the expertise and experience of NEDs which allows them 
to meet their increased obligations. Our argument about the increasing importance of NEDs’ 
compensation is underlined by the observed 63% increase in median compensation during the 
period of this study (i.e., 2004-12). Further, the recently introduced ‘say on pay’ (SOP) 
legislation in Australia also recognises the importance of NEDs’ compensation and enables 
shareholders to vote both on executive and non-executive directors’ compensation 
(Corporations Amendment Act – For Improving Accountability of Directors and Executive 
Remuneration, 2011). Accordingly we aim to provide evidence on some of the key 
determinants of NEDs’ compensation in Australia, which may guide firms and compensation 
committees to develop ‘optimal’ compensation for NEDs. 
The second motivation for this study is to build on and extend earlier U.S. based evidence on 
NED compensation (Boyd 1996, Bryan, et al., 2000a, Yermack, 2004 and Linn and Park, 
2005) to a setting with different governance and institutional features. U.S. research focuses 
primarily on periods of the 1990s prior to the recent regulatory focus on NEDs. Further, U.S. 
results may not be applicable to the Australian institutional setting for a number of reasons. 
First, CEO/Chairman duality in Australia is uncommon and only five percent of our sample 
combine these roles. This is quite different from the U.S. setting where we estimate that 
approximately 60% of boards have CEO and chairperson duality.4 In Australia, the 
chairperson is typically a NED and his/her compensation is on average 36% of the CEO’s 
compensation. Second, the chairperson, apart from the ‘usual’ duties of a ‘lead’ NED, has 
additional decision rights and responsibilities and is involved in shaping the strategic 
direction of a firm. For example, the recently appointed non-executive Chair of AMP, Simon 
McKeon said ‘no changes to the company’s strategy are required to boost the ugly share price 
                                                 
3 See for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the U.S., or the Australian Securities Exchange 2003 
Corporate Governance principles and recommendations in Australia. 
4 This statistic is calculated based on data between 2004 and 2012 contained in the Corporate Library database. 
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performance’ (Liew and Pattern 2014). Similarly, Peter Mason, the recently appointed chair 
of David Jones, has been called upon from shareholders to review Myer’s $3.2 billion merger 
proposal as part of the firm’s new strategic direction (Mitchell and Spragul 2014). As a result 
of their additional responsibilities the non-executive chairperson typically receives higher 
compensation than the other NEDs on the board. Accordingly, we aim to provide evidence on 
the economic and director-specific determinants of both the level of chairperson’s 
compensation and the premium they are paid beyond other NEDs. 
A further institutional difference between the U.S. and Australia is that, there is a non-
binding Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) guidance which recommends against 
remunerating NEDs based on firm performance. Additionally, the ASX and Productivity 
Commission guidelines recommend against remunerating NEDs using equity based 
compensation. As a result, only 25% of Australian NEDs receive equity based compensation 
and on average equity compensation is economically insignificant as it represents only 10% 
of total NED compensation. In contrast, Yermack (2004) finds that 62% of U.S. outside 
director compensation is paid as equity. Consequently, it is questionable as to whether the 
significant determinants of NED compensation observed in the U.S. also apply in Australia. 
In addition, due to the infrequent use of equity based compensation it remains an empirical 
question as to whether there is an association between changes in NEDs’ compensation and 
firm performance. Accordingly, we provide some of this evidence in Australia.  
Our evidence is based on a sample of 1,621 ASX listed firms (8,737 firm-years) for the 
period 2004 to 2012. The mean NED and chairperson total compensation are respectively 
$42,404 and $83,450.5 Our empirical findings indicate that firm characteristics such as firm 
size and complexity, liquidity and the number of board meetings are positively and 
significantly associated with NED compensation. Conversely, firm growth and performance 
are negatively associated with NED compensation. Director-specific characteristics, such as 
the number of other executive board seats held and the level of involvement within the firm 
on committees are also found to be associated with higher NED compensation. In contrast, 
director connectedness results in lower average compensation. We also find that the 
chairperson premium (i.e., the level of chairperson compensation greater than the average 
NED compensation) is not associated with a firm’s economic characteristics but is instead 
                                                 
5 As a basis of comparison Brick, et al., (2006) reports mean total director compensation of $67,225 for their 
sample of U.S. firms over the period 1992 to 2001. 
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driven by director-specific characteristics of both the chairperson and other NEDs. For 
instance, firms with more experienced and involved NEDs pay a lower chairperson premium. 
In contrast, a chairperson with prior experience as a NED or executive within the same firm 
is paid a higher premium. Our evidence as to whether NED compensation is positively 
associated with increases in firm performance produces mixed results. Whilst, we document a 
significant positive association between increases in NED pay and market returns, we find an 
insignificant association between return on assets and changes in NED pay. 
Our research makes a number of important contributions to the academic literature. First, it 
confirms that even after two decades of changes to the role and importance of NEDs, their 
compensation is consistent with firm characteristics which increase the demand for 
monitoring to reduce agency costs. Second, we add to previous literature and document that 
individual characteristics of NEDs such as the number of other board seats held, previous 
experience with the firm and social connectedness are also associated with NEDs’ 
compensation. Finally, we believe that this is the first study which provides insight into some 
of the key drivers of a non-executive chairperson’s compensation and premium. 
Our study also contributes to the determination of levels and structure of NEDs’ 
compensation in practice. For example, our results may help the board to explain and justify 
to shareholders prior to the SOP vote that the level of NED compensation is shaped by firm 
and director-specific characteristics. Our results may also guide policy makers to reconsider 
their recommendations with respect to the inclusion of equity based compensation for NEDs, 
which given the U.S. and our limited evidence may enhance the relations between firm 
performance and NEDs’ compensation. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the setting of NED 
compensation in the Australian institutional environment. Section 3 outlines prior literature 
and section 4 describes the economic, director-specific and other determinants that we 
believe are associated with NED compensation. The sample and descriptive statistics are 
described in section 5, whilst section 6 provides results. The final section of the paper 
presents a conclusion and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2 The Institutional Environment 
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The Australian institutional environment holds implications for the determination of NED 
compensation. The Corporations Act 2001 Section 208-211 states that financial benefits paid 
to a related party (including NEDs) are prohibited unless they are ‘reasonable’ or approved 
by shareholders. Compensation that is reasonable is described as being dependent on the 
circumstances of the company and the responsibilities required by the role.6 The board, or in 
larger firms, the nomination committee,7 agrees on the level of the fee pool for the NEDs and 
chairperson. Once the fee pool has been determined, it must be approved by shareholders. 
Subsequently, the board (or nomination committee) divides the fee pool between the 
individual NEDs and the chairperson. Typically each NED receives equal base compensation 
whilst the chairperson receives a higher level of compensation. However, an individual 
NED’s compensation may be higher than other directors due to their membership on board 
sub-committees. In 2011, the Australian Government introduced SOP legislation which 
enables shareholders to vote at the annual general meeting on the compensation awarded to 
the CEO and executive and non-executive directors.8 
The Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) provides a list of factors which should 
influence the level of NED compensation. Some factors include the firm’s size, nature, 
profitability and complexity, the industry sector, the risks and challenges faced by the firm 
and also director experience, time commitment, performance and responsibilities (AICD, 
2013). Compensation consultants may also provide guidance in setting NED compensation 
by supplying benchmark data from companies of a similar industry, size and complexity.9 
ASX Listing requirement 10.17.2 states that NED compensation should be in the form of a 
fixed sum (ASX, 2013). Furthermore, NEDs should not receive options and bonus payments 
(ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendation Guideline 8.2) nor participate 
in an executive share or option scheme (Productivity Commission, 2009). Directors in 
Australia also do not receive additional compensation for attending board meetings. 
The purpose of the guidelines against performance and share based pay of NEDs is to 
safeguard their independent decision making and to enhance the monitoring of executive 
management. The lack of performance-based pay of NEDs however conflicts with agency 
                                                 
6 Corporations Act 2001 section 211. 
7 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (Footnote 36 Principle 8) (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2007). 
8 Corporations Amendment (Improving accountability on director and executive remuneration) Act 2011. 
9 For example, the BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report states that fees for NEDs are “benchmarked against peer 
companies with the assistance of externally provided benchmark data” p.157. The Wesfarmers 2012 Annual 
Report states that fees are “benchmarked against comparable size companies” p.70.  
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theory, which suggests that compensation should be used to align director and shareholder 
interests (Cordeiro et al., 2000). Furthermore, Maug (1997) shows analytically that paying 
directors with shares or options increases their incentive to protect the interest of 
shareholders. The Australian institutional setting also stands in contrast to the practice in the 
U.S., where the majority of firms compensate NEDs using incentive structures (Bryan et al., 
2000a) including stock options (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005) and meeting attendance fees 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2008).  
3 Literature Review  
3.1 Determinants of NED Compensation 
Prior studies examining the determinants of NED compensation focus primarily on firm 
characteristics which increase the need for monitoring of executive management. For 
instance, Boyd (1996) finds that NED compensation is positively related to firm size and 
profitability and consistent with a reduced demand for monitoring reports that NED 
compensation is negatively related to board equity ownership. Later studies also conclude 
that determinants of NED compensation are based on the need to reduce agency costs 
between shareholders and executive management. Specifically, additional determinants 
include: other sources of external monitoring, investment opportunities, industrial 
diversification, firm risk and takeover threat (Bryan et al., 2000a; Cordeiro et al., 2000). 
More recently, Linn and Park (2005) find that firms with a larger investment opportunity set 
pay both a higher level of compensation to offset risk exposure and are more likely to use 
equity-based compensation to improve incentive alignment. They also find a positive 
association between firm size and NED compensation and conclude that larger firms employ 
more talented individuals with a higher marginal product. Furthermore, they find that 
compensation practices used to motivate NEDs are consistent with optimal contracting theory 
and are thus similar to CEO compensation practices. 
The main focus of Brick et al., (2006) is the association between excess director 
compensation and CEO compensation. They find evidence consistent with cronyism as 
excessive NED compensation is positively associated with the remuneration paid to the CEO. 
They model NED compensation as a function of economic and CEO characteristics and 
report that significant determinants of NED pay include: firm size, complexity and volatility 
which are positive and significant, while governance characteristics such as CEO-chairperson 
8 
 
 
duality, CEO gender and tenure and the number of board meetings are also significant 
determinants of NED pay. 
The evidence in these prior studies is U.S. dominated and is based on early data, small 
sample sizes and short sample periods.10 While the basic theory remains relevant, these 
factors reduce the ability to generalise the results to the Australian setting. As noted in the 
introduction the role and prevalence of NEDs has changed significantly over the past 
decade.11 Furthermore, as discussed previously there are a number of important institutional 
differences between Australia and the U.S. 
A number of studies also examine the influence of NED compensation on NED behaviour. 
Both Adams and Ferreira (2008) and Masulis and Mobbs (2014) find that NEDs’ board 
meeting attendance increases when they are paid a meeting attendance fee. Masulis and 
Mobbs (2014) also state that in unreported results they find that NEDs are less likely to 
depart a firm that pays them a higher annual retainer and per meeting fee. 
3.2 Changes in NED Compensation 
Although there is an extensive literature on the pay-performance link of CEO compensation, 
this area is largely under-researched for NEDs.12 Yermack (2004) tests the pay-performance 
sensitivity of NED compensation in the U.S. and finds that, after controlling for the change in 
firm size, a positive association exists between market based firm performance and changes 
in NED compensation. Yermack (2004) also finds that more than half of total NED 
incentives come from changes in the value of their stock and stock options. Instead of being 
driven by firm performance, Farrell et al., (2008) find that changes in NED compensation are 
driven by changes in the market level of NED compensation. Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2004) 
find that equity based compensation and board independence are positively associated, 
thereby suggesting that compensation is more closely aligned to performance when NEDs 
have greater bargaining power over the CEO. While these U.S. based studies provide 
                                                 
10 Boyd (1996) uses a sample of 92 firms in 1980 and 450 firms in 1987. Cordeiro et al., (2000) uses a sample of 
200 U.S. firms in 1996 while Bryan et al., (2000a) uses a sample of 1,700 U.S. firms between 1992 and 1997. 
Although it presents more contemporary evidence, Linn and Park (2005) lacks generalisability to the Australian 
setting as it is based on only the 200 largest U.S. corporations between 1996 and 2001.  
11 The introduction of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations in 2003 provided 
guidelines on board independence and the role of NEDs. Concurrently, the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act in 2002 also increased the importance of NEDs.  
12 The pay-performance link for CEO compensation is well documented in the U.S. (Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Hall and Liebman, 1998) and in Australia (Clarkson et al., 2011; Matolcsy and Wright, 2011; Matolcsy et al., 
2012, Schultz et al., 2013). 
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evidence of a pay-performance link, it remains unclear as to whether these findings are 
applicable in the Australian institutional setting. In particular, unlike the U.S., the NEDs of 
Australian firms do not receive meeting attendance fees and the vast majority do not receive 
equity-based compensation. 
4  Economic, director-specific and other determinants of NED compensation 
4.1 The Role of Non-Executive Directors’ Compensation 
The primary role of NEDs is to monitor and advise the CEO and other executive directors on 
behalf of the shareholders and hence minimise agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). An 
efficient level of compensation should thus provide NEDs with the incentive to perform their 
monitoring and advising duties. Consequently, the economic characteristics of a firm which 
determine both the difficulty and the need for monitoring are expected to be associated with 
the compensation awarded to NEDs. 
In addition to reflecting firm characteristics which determine the complexity and necessity of 
monitoring, the compensation paid to NEDs must also reward them for the skill and expertise 
they have developed as decision monitors. As such, the level of their compensation must be 
set to attract and retain talented, experienced and reputable individuals.13 For instance, 
reputable and experienced directors are more inclined to perform their monitoring role and 
fiduciary duties (Hahn and Lasfer, 2011) to the best of their ability to ensure that their 
reputation is upheld (Armstrong et al., 2010). In doing so, they also adequately fulfil their 
role as an agent of shareholders (Shivadasani and Yermack, 1999; Kaufman et al., 2006). 
Consistent with the above discussion, we expect that NED compensation is a function of both 
the underlying economic characteristics of the firm (demand side factors) and director 
characteristics (supply side factors). 
4.2 Determinants of NED Compensation 
4.2.1 Economic Determinants 
Firm Size and Complexity 
Prior literature on CEO compensation has established that larger firms with more complex 
operations demand higher quality managers (Rosen, 1982; Smith and Watts, 1992). Using 
similar reasoning, it is expected that larger, more complex firms require higher quality NEDs 
                                                 
13 As stated in the BHP Billiton Annual Report 2012 “The remuneration rates of NEDs are set at a level which 
will attract and retain the calibre of directors necessary to contribute to a high performing board ” (p. 157).  
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due to the greater difficulty of monitoring in these firms (Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Brick et al., 
2006). An increased difficulty to monitor suggests that NEDs would be expected to commit a 
greater amount of time and engagement with the firm to gain a sufficient understanding of its 
activities. Consistent with this argument, larger firms are predicted to be associated with 
higher NED compensation.14 Additionally, it is expected that the NEDs of larger firms 
experience a greater scope of responsibility and risk exposure to reputation damage and legal 
liability and must receive higher remuneration to compensate for this additional risk. 
Consistent with prior literature, size and complexity are proxied for using respectively the 
natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LnMktCap) and the number of subsidiaries 
(LnSub) (Linck et al., 2008). 
Multi-national diversification also signals greater firm complexity. Bushman et al., (2004) 
find that geographical diversification leads to complex decision-making and creates a range 
of monitoring difficulties. It also leads to information asymmetries and complexities resultant 
of factors such as geographic dispersion, multiple currencies, language, cultural and legal 
differences (Reeb et al., 1998; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Denis et al., 2003). This increased 
information asymmetry heightens the engagement required of NEDs in performing their 
monitoring and advising roles. Therefore, it is expected that geographical diversification 
results in greater NED compensation. The natural logarithm of the number of foreign 
subsidiaries is used to measure geographical diversification (LnForSub).15 
Growth and Investment Opportunities  
Consistent with prior studies on NED and CEO compensation, growth and investment 
opportunities are included as an economic determinant of compensation (Core et al., 1999; 
Bryan et al., 2000a; Cordiero et al., 2000; Linn and Park, 2005; Matolcsy and Wright, 2011). 
High growth firms experience higher information asymmetries as greater firm-specific 
knowledge is required to take timely advantage of competitive opportunities (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1992). The NEDs of high growth firms are thus required to 
expend greater effort in gaining firm specific knowledge and dealing with more frequent and 
complex issues that arise during times of rapid growth (Cordeiro et al., 2000). This additional 
effort required by NEDs is consistent with a positive relation to their compensation. Higher 
                                                 
14 This determinant is also consistent with benchmarking based on size and complexity performed by 
compensation consultants.  
15 Business and geographic segments were not used as proxies for size and complexity due to large amounts of 
missing data. Furthermore, AASB 8 “Operating Segments” introduced on 1 January 2009 requires the reporting 
of either business or geographic segments, but not both, reducing the reliability of this proxy. 
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compensation is also required to offset the additional risk associated with high growth firms 
(Linn and Park, 2005). Furthermore, NEDs are found to add more value when firms have 
higher investment growth options (Matolcsy et al., 2004). Therefore, firms with more growth 
options are expected to demand more experienced NEDs and as a result provide them with 
greater compensation. The market to book ratio (MTB) is used to proxy for growth and 
investment opportunities (Penman, 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Matolcsy et al., 2004) 
Firm Risk/Volatility 
Firms experiencing high stock return volatility are more likely to have specific information 
unknown to outsiders (Jensen, 1983). High information asymmetry increases the difficulty of 
the monitoring role for NEDs as they must expend both a higher level and more continuous 
effort to gain a reasonable understanding of a dynamic and highly variable business 
environment (Brick et al., 2006). High information asymmetry also increases the importance 
of NEDs due to shareholders and other outsiders having less firm specific information and, 
therefore, relying more on NEDs to monitor senior management. Because of the greater level 
of effort required and the increased importance of NEDs, firm risk is expected to be 
positively associated with NEDs’ compensation. Supporting this argument, CEO 
compensation is found to be higher in firms with greater stock return volatility (Cyert et al.,. 
1997). The standard deviation of monthly stock returns (StdRet) is used to proxy for firm risk 
and volatility (Linck et al., 2008). 
Liquidity 
Due to the ASX recommendations that NEDs be compensated with fixed cash compensation, 
firms experiencing lower levels of liquidity may pay their NEDs less or alternatively resort to 
equity compensation. Therefore, consistent with Bryan et al., (2000a), it is expected that 
liquidity is positively associated with NED compensation. The current ratio is used as a 
measure of firm liquidity (Cur_ratio). In summary, we predict that NED compensation is 
positively associated with: firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. 
4.2.2 Director–Specific Determinants 
NED Reputational Capital and Experience 
NEDs are often from diverse backgrounds and contribute new expertise, reputational capital 
and business contacts (Matolcsy et al., 2004). A number of studies document a reputation 
effect experienced by NEDs with Yermack (2004) and Ferris et al. (2003) showing a positive 
association between firm performance and the subsequent acquisition of new board seats by 
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NEDs (Yermack 2004, Ferris et al., 2003). Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find that directors 
holding numerous board seats are more likely to depart a board following poor performance.  
This study argues that NEDs with more experience and a higher reputation at stake, as 
measured by the number of other board seats they hold, are better monitors and advisors to 
senior management. They are expected to be more effective monitors due to their greater 
level of knowledge and skill arising from their experience and are also more likely to 
adequately fulfil their duties to protect their reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In terms of strategy, such directors are likely to hold greater accumulated general and 
industry-specific business knowledge due to their experience in more than one firm 
(Matolcsy et al., 2004). They are also likely to hold more substantial business networks 
owing to their reputation and numerous board seats (Matolcsy et al., 2004). Masulis and 
Mobbs (2011) find evidence that more experienced executives (those holding multiple NED 
board seats) lead to increased firm performance and growth and more optimal acquisition 
decisions. Accordingly, NEDs with greater experience and reputational capital are more 
adequately equipped to perform their role and it is expected that such NEDs demand a greater 
level of compensation to be attracted to and retained by the firm. The reputation and level of 
experience of the NEDs are measured at the board level using the average number of external 
executive board seats (ExecSeats) and external NED board seats (NEDSeats) held on ASX 
listed companies.16 
Connectedness of Non-Executive Directors   
Larcker et al., (2013) find that better connected boards have higher firm performance. This 
improved performance may flow from greater access to information on industry trends, 
economic conditions and regulation running across the boardroom network. Additionally, a 
board may be well connected when it is perceived to be powerful and prestigious (Larcker et 
al., 2013). It is expected that a similar phenomenon occurs at the director level, with NEDs 
being better connected if they hold a board seat which is perceived to be powerful and 
prestigious. Such NEDs are expected to hold a network of relationships linking them to other 
highly reputable and connected people and enable them to leverage these connections. Well-
connected NEDs are expected to be aware of their ability to add-value to the firm and use this 
as leverage to demand greater compensation. 
                                                 
16 Board seats on not for profit entities, trusts and government boards may also proxy for experience and 
reputation but information on non-ASX directorships is not readily available. We attempt to partially control for 
these other board seats using our Connectedness variable. 
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To proxy for the connectedness of NEDs, an indicator variable is used to distinguish firms 
with at least one board member who is on a connected board (Connectedness). Given that 
NEDs are often paid equal fixed cash retainers, it is possible that the existence of just one 
connected NED on the board increases the compensation paid to all NEDs. Connected boards 
are defined to include those on the Crikey “trophy board” list,17 the four largest art galleries 
in Australia18 and the top eight most trusted Australian charities.19 “Trophy boards”, art 
galleries and charities are chosen to proxy for prestigious organisations as it is expected that 
in order to attain a board membership on these organisations a director must have a well-
established reputation within the corporate community. In addition, board members of 
charities are often selected for their ability to fundraise and act as a figurehead for the 
organisation suggesting that this selection criterion is based on a previously established 
reputation.20  
Involvement in the Firm  
The ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines recommend that firms establish board sub-
committees to deal with specific governance matters (e.g. nomination, remuneration and audit 
committees) (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007). Board sub-committee members 
are subject to a greater level of responsibility, require greater expertise and also require 
greater time commitment. Therefore, board sub-committee membership is expected to 
increase the level of NED compensation. Membership of NEDs on a board committee is 
proxied for by the average number of committee memberships held by the NEDs 
(Committees). In summary, we expect that NED compensation is positively associated with: 
                                                 
17 Crikey is an online magazine. It aims to; “to bring its readers the inside word on what’s really going on in 
politics, government, media, business, the arts, sport and other aspects of public life in Australia”. The magazine 
compiles a list of the top 25 “trophy boards.” The article states that the “The directors sitting on the nation’s not-
for-profit “trophy boards” — the 25 or so mostly visual and performing arts jewels that any assiduous networker 
would give their unvested stock options to join — reads like a who’s who of ruling class gatekeepers.” Source: 
http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/10/19/power-and-privilege-the-25-trophy-boards-high-flyers-covet/ Accessed: 
7th of November 2013. 
18 The four largest art galleries in Australia include the National Gallery of Australia, Art Gallery of New South 
Wales, National Gallery of Victoria and Museums Board of Victoria (IBISWorld, 2013).  
19 Based on a survey of 1,200 Australians, the top eight most trusted charities include the Salvation Army, The 
Red Cross, Cancer Council, St Vincent De Paul, RSPCA, World Vision, Guide Dogs, and Royal Children’s 
Hospital (Cavill Societal Marketing and Di Marzio Research, 2011).  
20 We acknowledge that our variable is an imperfect measure of director connectedness across both listed and 
unlisted boards. The results we find on this variable should therefore be viewed as preliminary evidence on how 
director connectedness influences NED compensation.  Re-estimating our analysis after excluding the 
Connectedness variable does not change the conclusions from our results. 
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the number of other board appointments, director connectedness and greater committee 
membership. 
4.2.3 Other Determinants 
Board Meetings 
As the number of annual board meetings is unregulated in Australia, there is potential for 
significant variation between firms. This variation provides an indication of the level of 
engagement required from NEDs in each firm. Firms requiring a greater level of engagement 
hold more board meetings to boost NEDs’ involvement in the firm’s decision-making. In 
order to compensate NEDs for this greater time commitment, the level of compensation is 
predicted to be positively related to the number of board meetings. As a result, the number of 
board meetings per year (Meetings) is added to the model of NED compensation.21 
 
Substantial Shareholder Ownership  
Prior literature shows that large outside stock holdings facilitate effective monitoring (Bryan 
et al., 2000b) and ensure that management invest in value-maximising projects (Graves, 
1988; Hansen and Hill, 1991; Bushee, 1998). Therefore, outside monitoring is likely to 
reduce the importance of NEDs in fulfilling their role as agents for shareholders ultimately 
resulting in lower compensation. Additionally, as NEDs play a highly influential role in 
determining their own compensation it is possible that they may award themselves excessive 
compensation (Brick et al.,2006). However, the monitoring of substantial outside 
shareholders is likely to reduce the ability of NEDs to compensate themselves excessively. 
Our model tests for the influence on NED compensation of the number of shareholders with 
over 5% in firm ownership (SUBSH).22 In summary, we expect that NED compensation is 
positively associated with: the number of board meetings and negatively associated with the 
number of substantial shareholders. 
4.2.4 Model of NED compensation 
To test the determinants of NED compensation the following panel regression is estimated: 
 
                                                 
21 The number of board meetings attended by directors is an alternative measure of the involvement of NEDs 
with a firm. However, details on board meeting attendance are not electronically available. 
22 Individual shareholdings of NEDs has been considered as a determinant of the level of compensation, 
however such data is not available in machine readable form and is therefore beyond the scope of this study.  
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LnComp = α + β1LnMktCap + β2 LnSub + β3 LnForsub + β4 MTB + β5StdRet + β6Cur_ratio 
+ β7ExecSeats   + β8NEDSeats + β9Connectedness + β10Committees + β11Meetings + β12 
SubSH + β13IAROA + β14DualCEOChair + β15BoardComp + β16ChairIndicator + 
Industry + Year + ε                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
The dependent variable is alternatively measured as the natural logarithm of: combined 
average compensation of NEDs including the chairperson (LnCOMBComp); average NED 
compensation excluding the chairperson (LnNEDComp) and chairperson compensation 
(LnCHAIRComp).23 The independent variables are those outlined in the prior sections and 
remain constant for each model except that the model for the chairperson includes two 
additional indicator variables highlighting whether the chairperson has prior non-executive 
(PrNED) or executive (PrNED) experience with the same firm. The model also includes a 
number of additional control variables. Firm performance is controlled for using industry 
adjusted return on assets (IAROA) as better performing firms are expected to provide greater 
compensation to their board members.24 Governance controls include board composition 
(BoardComp) measured as the number of NEDs divided by board size and an indicator 
variable denoting the presence of a dual CEO/Chairperson (DualCEOChair). In the model 
using LnCOMBComp as the dependent variable, an additional indicator variable denoting 
boards with a non-executive chairperson (ChairIndicator) is added as a control. As we are 
using panel data the models are estimated using fixed effects (grouped by firm) to control for 
unobservable firm characteristics which may affect the level of NED compensation.25 The 
model also uses robust standard errors clustered by firm to mitigate the existence of 
heteroskedasticity.26 Year and industry indicator variables are included in the model to 
control for year and industry fixed effects.27 
                                                 
23 Each of these measures is calculated using total compensation. The results of robustness testing using cash 
and equity compensation is reported separately in section 6.5. 
24 The analysis presented in this study is also conducted using unadjusted ROA instead of industry adjusted 
ROA with no change in results. 
25 The need to use a fixed effects panel regression is confirmed using the findings of a Hausman Test which 
indicates that a fixed effect model is more appropriate than a random effects model (Greene, 2008). 
26 The White’s Test and the Breusch-Pagan Test both confirm the existence of heteroskedasticity. 
27 Industries are defined using two-digit GICS codes. 
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4.3 Determinants of the Chairperson Premium 
When the pool of NED compensation is distributed, the chairperson typically receives a 
premium to compensate them for their increased responsibilities.28 We define the chairperson 
premium as the difference between the chairperson compensation minus the average NED 
compensation divided by average NED compensation (CHAIR_Prem). It is expected that 
many of the economic and director-specific determinants of NED compensation also drive 
the chairperson premium. However, it is expected that the skills, experience and firm 
involvement of the NEDs vis-à-vis the chairperson influences the chairperson premium. For 
example, a board with higher/(lower) calibre NEDs is expected to compensate their 
chairperson less/(more). This is based on the idea that NEDs are paid more if they are of a 
higher quality, as the pressure on the chairperson is reduced as he/she is able to rely more on 
the skill and expertise of the other NEDs. Therefore, it is expected that firms with NEDs that 
are highly connected, reputable, experienced and more involved in the firm, pay a lower 
chairperson premium. 
We examine the determinants of the chairperson premium by estimating regression model 
(2). The economic variables are defined in a consistent manner to model (1). The director-
specific variables are separated into unique variables for the chairperson (_CHAIR) and other 
NEDs (_NED) to allow for a comparison of whether the characteristics of the chairperson and 
NEDs differ in their effect on the chairperson premium.29 Other controls, industry and year 
indicators are consistent with model (1). 
 
CHAIR_Prem = α + β1LnMktCap + β2 LnSub + β3 LnForsub + β4 MTB + β5StdRet + 
β6Cur_ratio + β7ExecSeats_NED   + β8ExecSeats_CHAIR + β9NEDSeats_NED + 
β10NEDSeats_CHAIR + β11PrNED + β12PrExec +β13Connectedness_NED + 
β14Connectedness_CHAIR + β15Committees_NED + β16Committees_CHAIR + 
β17Meetings + β18SubSH + β19IAROA + β20 DualCEOChair + β21 BoardComp + Industry 
+ Year + ε                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
                                                 
28 For example, in 2013, the Wesfarmers (Commonwealth Bank) chairperson was paid $592,800 ($849,800) 
while all other NEDs were paid a base fee of $197,600 ($236,400) Source: 2013 Annual Report Commonwealth 
Bank; 2013 Annual Report Wesfarmers Group. 
29 The Hausman Test reports a significant Chi-squared of 67.08 (p-value<0.0025) indicating that fixed effects 
(grouped by firm) are required in this panel regression model. 
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4.4 Changes in NED Compensation 
As discussed in section two regulators in Australia advise against compensating NEDs based 
on firm performance. However, under agency theory, agency costs are reduced when a strong 
pay-performance link exists. In addition, U.S. evidence (Yermack, 2004) indicates that most 
firms compensate their NEDs with equity-based compensation. Therefore, the Australian 
institutional environment and agency theory present a conflicting expectation as to whether 
changes in NED compensation are linked with changes in firm performance. We examine the 
relationship between the change in NED compensation and firm performance using the 
following regression model:30 
 COMPt = α + β1PERFt-1 + β2  ASSETSt-1 + Industry + Year + ε                                  (3) 
The dependent variable is the change in NED compensation measured as the lagged 
percentage change in average NED compensation. The model is tested using alternate 
dependent variables for changes in: i) combined NED and chairperson compensation 
(COMBCOMP) ii) average NED compensation (NEDCOMP) and iii) chairperson 
compensation (CHAIRCOMP). Years in which there was a change in the chairperson are 
excluded from the sample. The first independent variable is firm performance (Perf) 
measured alternatively as either the annual lagged market-adjusted buy-hold abnormal stock 
return (MKTADJRET) or the lagged industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA).31 Similar to 
Yermack (2004), the change in firm size is also included as an independent variable 
calculated as the lagged percentage change in assets ( ASSETS). Consistent with the earlier 
analysis model (3) includes industry and year indicator variables.32 
Table 1 provides a summary of all variables include in the regression models. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
                                                 
30 The aim of this study is to examine whether changes in NED compensation are associated with firm 
performance. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine if the improved performance is the outcome of the 
performance of the NEDs. 
31 Results are qualitatively similar if unadjusted market returns are used. 
32 A Hausman Test indicates that fixed effects (grouped by firm) are most appropriate for the models using 
COMBCOMP and NEDCOMP as the dependent variable. However, the test indicates that a random effects 
model is more appropriate for the regression using the change in chairperson compensation as the dependant 
variable. 
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5. Sample and Data 
5.1 Sample selection 
The evidence in this study is based on a sample of ASX listed firms for the period 2004 to 
2012.33 Accounting and substantial shareholding ownership data are collected from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis database. Stock price information is obtained from the Thomson 
Reuters DataStream database. Details on the identity and compensation of directors are  
 
 
Table 1 Variable names and definitions 
Variable Definition 
LnCOMBComp Natural log of average total compensation paid to NEDs including the chairperson 
LnNEDComp Natural log of average total compensation paid to NEDs excluding the 
chairperson 
LnCHAIRComp Natural log of total compensation paid to the chairperson 
CHAIR_Prem Total chairperson compensation minus total average NED compensation divided 
by total average NED compensation 
LnMktCap Natural log of market capitalisation 
LnSub Natural log of the number of subsidiaries 
LnForSub Natural log of the number of foreign subsidiaries 
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
StdRet Standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the 12 months of the current 
fiscal year 
Cur_ratio Current ratio 
ExecSeats Average number of external executive board seats held by NEDs and chairperson 
combined (_COMB) and NEDs only (_NED).  For the chairperson this variable is 
the number of external executive board seats (_CHAIR) 
NEDSeats Average number of external non-executive board seats held by NEDs and 
chairperson combined (_COMB) and NEDs only (_NED). For the chairperson this 
variable is the number of external NED board seats (_CHAIR) 
Connectedness Indicator variable equal to 1 if the board comprises connected NEDs or 
Chairperson (_COMB), connected NEDs (_NED), connected chairperson 
(_CHAIR) and 0 otherwise 
Committees Average number of committee seats held by the NEDs and chairperson combined 
(_COMB), NEDs (_NED), chairperson (_CHAIR)  
PrNED Indicator variable equal to 1 if the chairperson was previously a NED within the 
firm, and 0 otherwise 
                                                 
33 The disclosure requirements for director compensation have primarily remained unchanged over our sample 
period. In 2004, AASB 1046 “Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities” was introduced to 
require disclosure of the dollar amount of compensation paid to directors separated into four categories: primary 
benefits; post-employment benefits; equity compensation and other compensation benefits (para. 5.2). Similar 
disclosure requirements are presently included in AASB 124 “Related Party Disclosures.” Prior to 2004, AASB 
1017 “Related Party Disclosures” only required disclosure of director compensation for each successive $10,000 
band of income (para. 4.2). 
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PrExec Indicator variable equal to 1 if the chairperson was previously an executive within 
the firm, and 0 otherwise  
Meetings Number of board meetings held per year 
SubSh Number of substantial shareholders 
IAROA Industry-adjusted return on assets 
DualCEOCHAIR Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson and 0 otherwise 
BoardComp Number of NEDs divided by total board size 
ChairIndicator Indicator variable equal to 1 if the board has a non-executive chairperson 
 COMP Percentage change in total compensation between year t and year t-1 
Perf Lagged firm performance measured as either MKTAJRET or IAROA 
MKTADJRET Market adjusted buy and hold annual stock return in year t-1 
 ASSETS Percentage change in assets between year t and year t-1 
 
collected from the Thomson Reuters Connect4 Boardroom database. As this database simply 
classifies directors as either executive or non-executive we are unable to further classify 
directors as grey or independent. Board meetings data is partially obtained from SIRCA 
Limited and partially hand-collected. Data on whether NEDs hold board seats on connected 
boards are hand-collected from the respective annual reports. The initial sample of 19,378 
firm-years (2,305 firms) from DatAnalysis is reduced to 8,737 (1,621 firms) after deleting 
firm years with missing data, foreign currency and negative compensation. A breakdown of 
the sample selection process is provided in Panel A of Table 2. 
 (Insert Table 2 about here) 
Panel B of Table 2 displays the frequency of firm-years classified by industry for the total 
sample of combined NED and chairperson compensation and then NED and chairperson sub-
samples respectively. The number of firm years for the NED compensation sub-sample is 
8,509, while the number of chairperson firm-year observations is 6,505. The number of 
chairperson observations is lower as firms with an executive chairperson are excluded from 
the sample. Firm-years in the materials industry dominate the sample (48%), followed by the 
financial industry (17%).  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables included in models 
(1) and (2). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
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The average compensation of NEDs including the chairperson is $50,212, while the average 
NED compensation is $42,404 and the average chairperson compensation is $83,450.34  
Furthermore, consistent with prior literature (Matolcsy and Wright, 2011), economic 
characteristics including market capitalisation, subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries are 
transformed into the natural logarithm. Descriptive statistics for the economic determinants 
are consistent with prior literature. In terms of the director-specific determinants, the average 
number of external executive board seats (Execseats_Comb) held by the combined sample 
(including NEDs and the chairperson) is 0.182, whilst the average number of external NED 
board seats (NEDseats_Comb) held by the combined sample (including NEDs and the 
chairperson) is 1.042. The proportion of boards which are connected is 4.2%, and the number 
of committee seats held by the combined sample (including NEDs and the chairperson) is on 
average 1.281. The descriptive statistics also indicate that 18.7% (4.6%) of chairpersons were 
previously a NED (executive) in the same firm. To reduce the effect of outliers industry-
adjusted ROA, market adjusted returns and all economic determinants are winsorised at the 
5% level prior to estimating our regression models. 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the regression variables included in model (3). The 
average annual change in combined compensation is 29.5%. Interestingly, the average annual 
change in NED compensation is much larger (32%) than the average change in chairperson 
compensation (13%). The mean market adjusted annual stock return is 8.4%.  
In untabulated findings we estimated a Pearson correlation matrix for all variables included in 
the analyses. The largest correlation which exists between variables in the same regression is 
that between the number of foreign subsidiaries (LnForSub) and the number of subsidiaries 
(LnSub) (0.5793). The number of subsidiaries (LnSub) is also correlated with firm size 
(LnMktCap) (0.5464). The size of the correlations suggest there is no multicollinearity issue 
with the estimation of the regression models and this is confirmed with VIF diagnostic tests.  
                                                 
34 Cash compensation is on average, $40,660 compared to equity, which is on average $15. Approximately 25% 
of firms remunerate their NEDs with equity. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Determinants of the Level of NED Compensation 
Table 4 reports the results for the analysis of the determinants of the level of compensation 
using model (1). The dependent variable is alternated between the three measures of 
compensation, which either include or exclude the chairperson. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Column (1) reports the regression results for the combined NED and chairperson sample. The 
adjusted R-squared is 63.63% and the F-statistic is 28.62 indicating that the regression is 
significant at the 1% level. The R-squared is consistent with those in prior studies of NED 
compensation using fixed effects models of panel data (Brick et al., 2006). Consistent with 
prior studies and expectations, firms with greater size and complexity and higher liquidity pay 
their NEDs more compensation (Bryan et al., 2000a; Brick et al., 2006; Linn and Park, 2005). 
Inconsistent with expectations and Linn and Park, (2005) firm growth options are negative and 
significant and firm risk is insignificant. The negative result on firm growth options is 
unexpected, which may suggest that the proxy is measuring other constructs35 or alternatively 
high growth firms place greater importance on executive directors with greater firm-specific 
knowledge and, therefore, pay their NEDs less. 
In terms of director-specific determinants of compensation, the model shows that reputational 
capital and experience obtained on other executive board seats are positive and significant. In 
contrast, NEDs are not paid extra compensation for experience gained as non-executive 
directors on other boards. The NEDs level of involvement on committees within the firm is 
positive and significant thereby highlighting that NEDs are compensated for their additional 
time and responsibility associated with membership on board committees. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on connectedness of the board is negative and significant implying that the proxy 
is inadequate or connected NEDs do not demand greater pay. 
Consistent with expectations, a higher number of board meetings results in higher average NED 
compensation. The number of substantial shareholders however is not a significant determinant 
indicating that substantial shareholders have little influence over the level of NED 
                                                 
35 The market-to-book measure has also been used in other studies as a measure of overvaluation (Bugeja and da 
Silva Rosa, 2010), conservatism (Wang et al., 2009) and may also indicate that the firm has large off balance 
sheet intangible assets (Ramanna, 2008). 
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compensation. The findings on the other control variables are generally consistent with 
expectations with the exception of accounting-based firm performance, which is negative and 
significant inconsistent with prior studies (Bryan et al., 2000a; Brick et al., 2006). A possible 
explanation is that poorly performing firms need to pay NEDs more to entice them to become 
a member of their board. This result is also consistent with the theory that upholding their 
reputation is highly important for NEDs. Therefore, by sitting on the board of a poorly 
performing firm, they are incurring reputation damage and thus require greater compensation. 
Finally, the chairperson indicator variable is positive and significant, indicating that boards 
with a non-executive chairperson receive greater average compensation.  
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results for the determinants of average NED compensation 
excluding the chairperson. The adjusted R-squared is 59.93% and the F-statistic is 27.25, 
showing that the regression is significant at the 1% level. In this test, the results are similar to 
that of Column (1) but director connectedness becomes insignificant.  
Column (3) of Table  reports the determinants of the level of chairperson compensation using 
equation (1). The adjusted R-squared is 70.04% and the F-statistic is 16.45, indicating that the 
regression is significant at the 1% level. The findings are similar to column (1) with the 
exceptions of firm risk, which becomes negative and significant, and liquidity, which 
becomes insignificant. Contrary to expectations, the results report that high-risk firms pay 
their chairperson less. A possible explanation is that highly volatile firms place greater 
importance on executive directors and the CEO who hold more firm-specific knowledge, 
resulting in lower compensation for the non-executive chairperson. Consistent with an 
increase in expertise, prior experience within the firm as a NED (PrNED) or executive 
(PrExec) are both a positive and significant determinant of chairperson compensation. In 
contrast, prior expertise with another firm as either an executive or non-executive director is 
not associated with chairperson compensation. 
To assess the economic significance of our results we calculate the percentage change in 
compensation for a movement in one standard deviation for each of the variables included in 
model (1). The data in Table 3 indicates that the average combined and chairperson 
compensation is $50,212 and $83,450 respectively. As would be expected the variable which 
has the largest impact on NED compensation is firm size, with an increase in firm size by one 
standard deviation implying a rise in combined NED and chairperson compensation of 38%. 
The variable which has the next largest impact on NED remuneration is committee 
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membership. An increase of one standard deviation in committee membership 
(approximately one committee) raises combined NED and chairperson pay by 10% and NED 
(excluding chairperson pay) by 13%. In regards to the other variables which are significantly 
associated with compensation in Table 4, the change in compensation for a move of one 
standard deviation ranges between 2% for the current ratio and 5% for the market-to-book 
ratio. 
Table 5 reports the results of model (1) estimated separately for each year of the sample. In 
the interests of brevity the table shows only the results for the combined NED and 
chairperson sample.36 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
The adjusted R-squared ranges between 30.01% to 43.28% and the F-statistic ranges from 
20.04 to 39.08, indicating that the regression is significant at the 1% level. The R-squared is 
significantly lower than in Table 4 as the model no longer employs a fixed effects panel 
regression, however, it remains consistent with those in prior studies of NED compensation 
using a cross-sectional OLS regression (Brick et al., 2006). The findings on the year-by-year 
results differ slightly from those in Table 4. Interestingly, growth options only seem to 
influence NED compensation within the later years of the sample. Furthermore, the influence 
of firm risk is significantly positive from 2009 to 2011. It is notable that the significance of 
firm risk coincides with the period of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) suggesting that 
during the GFC NEDs were compensated with greater levels of pay for monitoring high risk 
firms. The significant result on liquidity in Table 4 is non-existent for much of the sample 
period. Consistent with Table 4, the results indicate that greater director experience and 
reputation leads to higher compensation (ExecSeats_COMB) with the results being 
statistically significant from 2007 onwards (other than 2011). Furthermore, connectedness of 
directors becomes positive and significant from 2009 to 2012 presenting an alternative result 
to that in Table 4, which was negative and significant. This result suggests that during and 
after the GFC firms allocated more funds to attracting connected NEDs to perhaps gain 
access to better information through their director networks (Larcker, et al., 2013). 
                                                 
36 The yearly results for the separate NED and chairperson subsamples are available on request from the 
corresponding author. 
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The individual year results for the determinants of the levels of NED and chairperson 
compensation (untabulated) are largely consistent with the results for the combined 
chairperson and NED sample provided in Table 5. For NEDs however the year-by-year 
results show that firm risk has no influence on average NED compensation, whilst director 
connectedness is a positive and significant determinant of NED compensation in 2010 and 
2011 Similar to the combined results, the year-by-year results indicate that firm risk is a 
positive and significant determinant of chairperson compensation between 2009 and 2011.  
Additionally, prior NED experience with the same firm results in a significant rise in 
chairperson compensation only in 2009. 
In summary, our results indicate that NED compensation is positively associated with firm 
economic characteristics particularly firm size and complexity. Unexpectedly firm growth is 
negatively associated with NED compensation and we find inconsistent evidence on whether 
firm risk increases or lowers NED remuneration. We also find some evidence that NED 
compensation is driven by director-specific characteristics. In particular, membership on 
board sub-committees increases NED compensation. The influence of experience varies 
between the chairperson and other NEDs. Whilst, other NEDs receive greater compensation 
for other executive board seats held, the chairperson only receives increased pay for previous 
experience with the same firm. The results on our connectedness variable are unexpectedly 
negative in the pooled analysis, although we do find some evidence of a positive effect on 
compensation in the year-by-year results. We also find that the number of board meetings 
increases NED compensation consistent with these firms requiring greater involvement of 
their NEDs. Inconsistent with expectations however, we find that the number of substantial 
shareholders is negative and insignificant. 
6.2 Determinants of the Chairperson Premium  
Table 6 reports the results for the determinants of the chairperson’s premium using equation 
(2).  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
The adjusted R-squared is 42.08% and the F-statistic is 4.55 indicating that the regression is 
significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, all of the economic determinants (e.g., firm size and 
complexity, growth options, risk and liquidity) are insignificant in explaining the chairperson 
premium. The director level characteristics including: other NED board seats, connectedness 
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and external experience are all statistically insignificant; however, prior experience by the 
chairperson with the same firm is positive and significant. This result highlights that firm 
specific knowledge and tenure within the firm is highly valued and, therefore, leads to a higher 
chairperson premium. The reputation and external experience of NEDs as executive directors 
at other firms, as well as the level of NED’s involvement in the firm are negative and significant 
determinants of the chairperson premium. This implies that when the NEDs are highly 
reputable and experienced and heavily involved in the firm, there is a reduced demand and 
reliance on the chairperson to perform, therefore, resulting in a lower chairperson premium. 
Similarly, if the chairperson is highly involved within the firm by participating on a larger 
number of committees then their premium is greater.  
As expected, the coefficient on Meetings is positive and significant indicating that the 
chairperson premium increases with the number of board meetings in order to compensate the 
chairperson for their time commitment and involvement in the firm’s decision-making. 
Substantial shareholding is insignificant, showing that larger shareholders have no influence 
in determining the chairperson premium. Results on the other control variables are consistent 
with those found in Table 4. However, board composition is positive and significant 
suggesting that firms with more independent boards pay a greater chairperson premium.37 
6.3 Changes in Compensation and Firm Performance 
Table 7 reports the results for the analysis of the association between changes in NED 
compensation and alternatively market and accounting based firm performance using 
Equation (3).  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Panel A reports the results for the changes in cash compensation.38 As the majority of firms 
in the sample compensate NEDs using only a fixed cash retainer we focus firstly on the 
change in cash compensation. By using only cash compensation we exclude one-off 
temporary increases in compensation which may occur when some firms make an equity 
                                                 
37 The descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate that some firms pay their chairperson less than the average 
amount paid to NEDs, resulting in a negative chairperson premium. Regression model (2) is re-estimated after 
excluding these observations and the conclusions from the results are unchanged. 
38 The mean changes in combined cash compensation, NED cash compensation and chairperson cash 
compensation are 19.7%; 21.4% and 10.4%, respectively.  
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grant to the NEDs. This is particularly important given that some equity awards are unusually 
large.39 Columns (1) through (3) report the results using market based performance, whilst 
columns (4) through (6) use IAROA as the measure of performance. The reported R-squared 
ranges from 16.43% to 37.81% and the F-values and Wald chi-squared are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. When we use a market-based measure of performance we 
find a significant positive association between firm performance and all three cash 
compensation variables (i.e., combined compensation and separate NED and chairperson 
compensation). This result is similar to the prior evidence found in U.S. studies (Yermack, 
2004). In contrast, when model (3) is estimated using IAROA as the performance metric, we 
find no significant association between the change in compensation and performance. The 
results also show that the change in firm size is significant and is positively associated with 
the increase in NED compensation. This shows that the cash retainer paid to NEDs increases 
as firm size grows and is consistent with pay increasing with higher levels of firm 
complexity. 
Panel B reports the results for the changes in total compensation including both cash and 
equity components. Once more results are presented using both a market and accounting 
measure of firm performance. The explanatory power of the regression models is consistent 
with those in Panel A. Similar to the results for cash compensation we find that the change in 
total compensation is significantly associated with market adjusted returns but is unrelated to 
accounting performance. In contrast to the results in Panel A, the change in firm size is only 
significant in two of the six regression models. Overall, our results therefore provide 
inconclusive evidence on whether NED compensation is set in order to reduce agency costs 
and align their interests with those of shareholders. 
To assess the economic significance of the results using MKTAJDRET as the performance 
benchmark, we make use of the results in Panel B of Table 7 and the average compensation 
statistics presented in Table 3. By extrapolating from this data a 1% increase in market 
adjusted returns, results in an annual increase in compensation of: $45.19 for the combined 
NED and chairperson sample; $37.74 for NEDs (excluding the chairperson) and $57.50 for 
the chairperson. Since the average market capitalisation of our sample is $39.9 million a 1% 
market adjusted return implies an increase in shareholder wealth of $399,000. Dividing these 
                                                 
39 Andrew Forrest of Poseidon Nickel Limited was paid $226,826,000 in options and rights $8,700,000 in shares 
and $40,000 in hybrids in the financial year of 2008. 
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findings into each other indicates that for each $1,000 increment in shareholder wealth NED 
compensation increases by: $0.113 for the combined sample; $0.094 for NEDs and $0.095 
for the chairperson. As a basis of comparison, using the cash retainer paid to outside directors 
Yermack (2004, p. 2294) reports a similar statistic of $0.004 for his U.S. sample. The 
difference between our results and those in Yermack (2004) is possibly explained by the 
much larger firm size in that study (Yermack, 2004 reports a median sample size of $6.6 
billion p. 2293). 
6.4 Sensitivity and Additional Testing 
Association between NED and CEO Compensation 
Brick et al., (2006) examine the relationship between excess director compensation and CEO 
compensation using U.S. data. Consistent with cronyism they find that excess director 
compensation is associated with higher CEO compensation. As the primary purpose of this 
study is to examine the determinants of NED compensation we leave it to subsequent research 
to provide a detailed investigation of the relationship between NED and CEO compensation.40 
As preliminary evidence however, we calculate the pairwise correlation between total CEO 
compensation (sourced from the Thomson Reuters Connect4 Boardroom database) and total 
NED; total chairperson and total combined director compensation. The results (untabulated) 
indicate that the correlation between total CEO compensation and total NED, total chairperson 
and total combined compensation are respectively: 0.59, 0.67 and 0.64. Each of the 
correlations are significant at the 1% level. As a basis of comparison Brick et al., (2006) report 
in Table 3 of their study a correlation between total CEO and total director compensation of 
0.514. The high positive correlation is not unexpected as the compensation for both CEOs and 
NEDs are determined by similar economic characteristics. Furthermore, we estimate regression 
models (1) and (2) with the inclusion of the natural logarithm of CEO compensation as an 
additional variable (LNCEOCOMP). We find that LNCEOCOMP is positively related to NED 
compensation and the chairperson premium. The conclusions drawn from the other variables 
do not change with the inclusion of CEO compensation in the regression models. 
                                                 
40 The lack of electronically available data in Australia on CEO characteristics such as CEO tenure, age, prior 
experience with the same firm etc. also limits our ability to examine the determinants of CEO compensation.  
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Cash and Equity Compensation Separately 
The regression results on the determinants of NED compensation presented in Table 4 are 
based on total compensation paid to NEDs and the chairperson. The regression model is also 
estimated separately for cash and equity based compensation (results not tabulated).41  The 
results on the determinants of NED cash compensation are largely consistent with those shown 
in Table 4 with the notable exception of the current ratio, industry-adjusted ROA and the 
number of board meetings, which are no longer a significant determinant of compensation. 
Furthermore, consistent with a reputation effect the number of outside NED board seats 
significantly increases NED compensation. 
Consistent with the main results, equity based NED compensation is found to be positively 
associated with firm size, liquidity, risk and complexity. The positive relationship on risk 
stands in contrast to the original results. Similar to the main test results, industry-adjusted ROA 
is negatively associated with equity based compensation. The amount of equity based 
compensation is not associated with committee membership or outside executive board seats, 
whilst outside NED experience is negatively related to equity based compensation. 
Impact of Firm Size 
To assess if the determinants of NED compensation differ across firm size, the regression 
analysis is re-estimated after partitioning the sample into firms inside and outside the ASX Top 
500 firms by market capitalisation (results not tabulated). The results for firms outside the Top 
500 are qualitatively unchanged from those presented. For firms within the Top 500, firm 
complexity, growth, board connectedness and experience are no longer significant, whilst risk 
is now negative and significant. The other results remain consistent with those presented. With 
the chairperson premium results, the results for Top 500 firms are unchanged other than foreign 
subsidiaries now being negatively related to the chair premium, whilst NED executive seats 
are now insignificant. For firms outside the Top 500 a number of additional variables attain 
significance with firm growth and liquidity negatively associated with the chairperson 
premium. 
Differences Across Industry 
                                                 
41 When equity compensation is used as the dependent variable, a Tobit regression is used due to the high 
frequency of observations equal to zero. These untabulated results are available on request. 
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Even though the regression analysis controls for industry fixed effects through the use of 
indicator variables, we re-run our analysis for total NED compensation after partitioning firms 
into the financials, mining and other industries (results not tabulated). For firms in other 
industries the significant determinants of compensation are identical to those in Table 4 except 
that risk is now negative and significant. The number of significant economic determinants 
decreases markedly for firms in the financial sector with only size being significant. Director 
connectedness and reputation remain negatively and positively significant, respectively, whilst 
industry adjusted ROA is no longer significant. Similar to financials, within the mining sector, 
the only significant economic determinant is firm size. Director reputation and industry-
adjusted ROA are respectively positively and negatively related to compensation. The 
coefficient on director connectedness is insignificant. 
The chairperson premium results are largely consistent across industry with the economic 
determinants continuing to be insignificant. The director characteristics continue to be a 
significant determinant of the chairperson premium with prior experience within the same firm 
being positive and significant for the mining and other industries but not financial firms. For 
financial firms, other board seats held by the chairperson reduce their compensation premium. 
Monitoring by Debt Holders and Auditors 
The monitoring role of NEDs may be diminished when the firm uses a high quality auditor or 
has active monitoring by debt holders (Jensen 1986). Prior findings on leverage are 
inconclusive, with Brick et al., (2006) reporting that leverage is positively related to NED 
compensation while Bryan et al., (2000a) find a negative relation. To test the impact of leverage 
and auditor quality, we add two additional variables to the regression model. The first variable 
is leverage measured as the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets. The second variable 
is an indicator variable highlighting firms which use a Big 4 auditor. The coefficient on 
leverage is negative and significant only for the combined NED and chairperson compensation 
sample, but is insignificant in the sub-samples of NED and chairperson compensation. The 
coefficient on the Big 4 auditor variable is insignificant. The conclusions on the other variables 
remain unchanged from those in the main results. 
Lagged Determinants Model  
Consistent with prior studies (Brick et al., 2006) the model of the determinants of NED 
compensation is estimated using lagged independent variables. The findings (untabulated) on 
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the economic determinants remain largely consistent with those presented except that firm 
growth and risk are now positively associated with NED and chairperson compensation 
respectively. The instability of the results on both these variables is similar to the inconsistent 
findings for growth and risk shown in the yearly regressions in Table 5. As such our study 
does not provide conclusive evidence on whether growth or risk influences Australian NED 
compensation. The results for director-specific characteristics, such as reputation and 
experience, are consistent with the main results. In contrast to the original results, the control 
variable for performance (i.e., industry-adjusted ROA) is now insignificant. 
Which Firms Pay Equity Compensation to NEDs? 
The vast majority of Australian firms do not compensate NEDs with equity-based 
compensation consistent with the non-binding ASX guidelines. To provide preliminary 
evidence on the characteristics of firms which choose to pay equity-based compensation, we 
estimate a logit regression with the dependant variable coded as one for firms paying equity 
compensation to their NEDs. The independent variables included in the model are the 
economic characteristics from Model (1). The untabulated results show that firm size, risk, 
growth and liquidity are positive and significant determinants of the choice to pay equity 
based compensation. Firm performance is negative and significant, indicating that poorly 
performing firms are more likely to pay equity based compensation. Interestingly, the number 
of subsidiaries is negative and significant whilst the number of foreign subsidiaries is positive 
and significant. This suggests that firms with foreign operations are more likely to pay 
equity-based compensation perhaps due to other institutional settings (such as the U.S.) not 
guiding against equity based compensation.  
The Impact of the “Two Strikes” Rule 
In 2011, Australia introduced a “two strikes” rule requiring the dissolution of the board of 
directors (except the CEO) if the remuneration report receives at least a 25 per cent dissent 
vote in two consecutive years. The introduction of the legislation is consistent with the 
emerging trend of increasing transparency and accountability of director and executive 
compensation in many developed countries.42 The literature examining the effect of the “two 
strikes” rule in Australia and SOP legislation in other countries is limited but growing. For 
                                                 
42The Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all have statute law requiring 
shareholder votes on executive compensation. 
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example, Monem and Ng (2013) provides recent Australian evidence that the “two strikes” 
rule led to an improvement in the CEO pay-performance link. To date there has been no 
empirical investigation into the impact of the “two strikes” rule on NED compensation. The 
financial press however suggests that the compensation of the chairperson in the Top 100 
ASX firms was cut by 3.5% in 2012 (Durkin, 2013). 
To provide preliminary evidence on the impact (if any) of the “two strikes” rule on NED 
compensation, Equation (3) is modified to include an indicator variable (POSTTWOSTRIKE) 
denoting years after  the rule came into effect. This indicator variable is also interacted with 
firm performance to examine if the “two-strikes” rule altered the pay-performance link for 
NEDs. The results of this regression (untabulated) show that both the POSTTWOSTRIKE 
indicator variable and the interaction term are insignificant. As such, this preliminary evidence 
shows the “two-strikes” rule is not associated with changes in NED compensation, nor has it 
altered the pay-performance link. 
 
Impact of winsorization 
As described in section 5.2 to reduce the effect of outliers industry-adjusted ROA, market 
adjusted returns and all economic determinants were winsorised at the 5% level.  To examine 
if winsoring the data has influenced our results, we repeated all of our analysis using the 
unadjusted data.  The conclusions from this additional analysis are largely consistent with 
those presented in the main tables with the following two exceptions.  Using the raw data we 
find that industry-adjusted ROA is not significantly associated with NED compensation or the 
chairperson premium.  Furthermore, firm risk as measured by the standard deviation of returns 
is now consistently positive and significant in explaining NED compensation both in aggregate 
and in the yearly regressions. 
6.4 Limitations 
The evidence presented in the study is limited to compensation and governance data included 
on the Connect4 database. As a result, construction of variables such as external executive 
(ExecSeats) and NED board seats (NEDSeats), as well as whether the chairperson was 
previously a NED (PrNED) or executive director (PrExec) within the same firm, are limited 
to details contained within the database. As a result, our measures are likely incomplete. 
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Second, there is a lack of readily available data on NED individual shareholdings. As 
suggested by Core et al., (1999), board ownership characteristics influence the optimal 
compensation package and it would be expected that NEDs with greater ownership in the 
firm would require less compensation to align their interests with shareholders. Ideally, board 
ownership would be included as a determinant of the level of NED compensation.  
Third, the proxy used in this study for board connectedness is a preliminary measure. Given 
that the theory of connected directors is relatively new in the literature (Larcker, et al., 2013), 
there is no well-established and widely accepted proxy to measure this director characteristic. 
Furthermore, data on boardroom networks beyond listed firms is not readily available.  
7 Conclusions 
This study examines the economic, director-specific and other determinants of the levels and 
changes in NED compensation. The findings show that NED compensation is associated with 
a number of economic characteristics of the firm, as well as characteristics of the NEDs 
themselves. More specifically, we find that NED compensation is positively associated with 
firm size and complexity. The influence of growth options on NED compensation is 
unexpectedly negative, whilst the findings on firm risk and liquidity are inconsistent across 
our analysis. We show that director-specific determinants also increase NED compensation. 
In particular, we find for NEDs excluding the chairperson that outside experience as an 
executive director raises their compensation. In contrast, for the chairperson their 
compensation increases with experience with the same organisation, rather than experience as 
a director with other firms. A higher level of involvement of NEDs within the firm on either 
committees or through a greater number of board meetings leads to higher compensation. We 
obtain mixed evidence on whether director connectedness increases NED compensation and 
find that substantial shareholder ownership is not associated with NED remuneration. 
We also examine the determinants of the additional pay awarded to the chairperson. Our 
results show that the additional compensation paid to the chairperson is associated with 
chairperson characteristics such as whether they have prior experience within the firm or 
whether they are highly involved in the firm. Furthermore, the chairperson receives less 
additional pay when the other NEDs are highly involved, reputable and experienced. This 
suggests that when the board contains high performing NEDs, less importance is placed on 
the chairperson. 
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In regards to changes in NED compensation, our results provide mixed evidence on the 
existence of a pay-performance relationship. Although we find a positive association between 
changes in compensation and market returns, our results indicate that changes in pay are not 
associated with accounting performance. Our results thus suggest that the Australian 
regulatory advice is possibly successful in restraining the link between NED remuneration 
and firm performance. 
The main contribution of this study is the introduction of director-specific determinants of 
NED compensation. It would be interesting for future research to extend this aspect of the 
study by examining how connectedness arises from positions in the public 
sector/government, social and leisure clubs or from school and university alumni groups. It 
would also be worthwhile for future research to examine the impact of the levels of NED 
compensation on director behaviour and economic outcomes. For example, do better 
compensated NEDs undertake better monitoring and improve mergers and acquisitions 
outcomes? In addition, while this study examines the association between compensation and 
average director characteristics measured at the board level, a future study could also 
examine the association between individual compensation packages and individual director 
characteristics. Although the NED compensation pool is often distributed evenly between the 
NEDs, such a study would provide further insight into why some NEDs are paid more than 
others within the firm. It should be noted that our results are subject to important caveats. In 
particular, due the Australian institutional environment the general applicability of our 
findings is primarily limited to settings, where typically the chairperson is not the CEO and 
where the primary source of compensation of NEDs is based on cash compensation. 
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Table 1- Sample Construction 
Table 2 Sample Construction 
Panel A: Sample Selection (firm-years) 
 
  
Total ASX listing of from DatAnalysis from 2004 to 2012 (including delisted)  19,378 
Deletions:   
Missing DatAnalysis data  6,806  
Missing Connect4 compensation data 3,482  
Firm-years reported in foreign currency   344 
 
 
Firm-years reporting negative compensation                                                                                                       9 10,641 
Total sample size   8,737 
Panel B: Frequency of firm-years by industry 
Industry 
(2 digit 
GICS) Energy Materials Industrials 
Cons. 
Disc. 
Cons. 
staples 
Health 
Care Financials I.T. Telco Utilities 
Total 
firm-
years 
Combined 1,320 4,183 1,250 101 40 91 1,476 91 21 164 8,737 
 15% 48% 14% 1% 1% 1% 17% 1% >1% 2% 100% 
NED 1,278 4,037 1,238 99 38 91 1,447 91 19 162 8,509 
 15% 47% 15% 1% 1% 1% 17% 1% >1% 2% 100% 
Chair 972 3,078 984 65 31 77 1,081 66 13 138 6,505 
 15% 47% 15% 1% 1% 1% 17% 1% >1% 2% 100% 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A Compensation and determinants 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Compensation variables       
LnCOMBComp 8,737 10.824 
($50,212) 
10.832 
($50,615) 
0.870 
($108,316) 
5.092 
($162) 
17.916 
($60,369,828) 
LnNEDComp 8,509 10.655 
($42,404) 
10.662 
($42,702) 
0.881 
($45,488) 
5.092 
($163) 
14.500 
($1,982,759) 
LnCHAIRComp 6,505 11.332 
($83,450) 
11.291 
($80,098) 
0.962 
($51,742) 
5.106 
($165) 
19.277 
($235,447,849)43 
CHAIR_Prem 6,646 1.150 0.827 1.526 -1 5.299 
       
Economic determinants       
LnMktCap 8,737 17.502 
($39,904,514) 
17.193 
($29,297,127) 
1.988 
($420,058,506) 
13.91 
($1,099,098) 
23.163 
($11,469,991,190) 
LnSub 8,737 1.674 
(5.333) 
1.386 
(3.999) 
1.083 
(2.954) 
0 
(0) 
6.178 
(482.037) 
LnForSub 8,737 0.696 
(2.006) 
0 
(0) 
0.990 
(2.691) 
0 
(0) 
5.878 
(357.094) 
MTB 8,737 2.186 1.46 1.974 0.32 7.8 
StdRet 8,737 0.190 0.170 0.108 0.044 0.446 
Cur_Ratio 8,737 8.310 3.3 11.069 0.370 41.98 
       
Director-specific 
determinants       
Execseats_COMB 8,737 0.182 0 0.616 0 17 
Execseats_NED 8,509 0.211 0 0.797 0 15 
Execseats_CHAIR 6,505 0.099 0 0.589 0 17 
NEDSeats_COMB 8,737 1.042 0.83 0.973 0 10.5 
NEDSeats_NED 8,509 0.900 0.67 0.967 0 9.5 
NEDSeats_CHAIR 6,505 1.479 1 1.781 0 13 
Connectedness_COMB 8,737 0.042 0 0.202 0 1 
Connectedness_NED 8,509 0.033 0 0.180 0 1 
Connectedness_CHAIR 6,505 0.012 0 0.109 0 1 
Committees_COMB 8,737 1.281 1 1.183 0 4.5 
Committees_NED 8,509 1.207 1 1.145 0 4.333 
Committees_CHAIR 6,505 1.172 0.5 1.440 0 5 
PrNED 6,505 0.187 0 0.390 0 1 
PrExec 6,505 0.046 0 0.209 0 1 
       
Other determinants       
Meetings 8,737 9.828 9 5.237 0 71 
SubSH 8,737 2.219 2 1.675 0 11 
       
Other control variables       
IAROA 8,737 -0.108 -0.002 0.304 -1.030 0.211 
DualCEOChair 8,737 0.050 0 0.217 0 1 
                                                 
43 Andrew Forrest of Poseidon Nickel Limited was paid $226,826,000 in options and rights $8,700,000 in shares and $40,000 in hybrids in 
the financial year of 2008.  
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BoardComp 8,737 0.678 0.667 0.172 0.143 1 
       
Panel B Descriptive statistics for changes in compensation 
Variable N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
COMBComp 7,114 0.295 0.025 0.883 -0.683 3.005 
NEDComp 6,905 0.316 0.017 0.951 -0.729 3.202 
CHAIRComp 3,309 0.128 0 0.466 -0.683 1.488 
MKTADJRET 7,114 0.084 -0.088 0.675 -0.690 1.999 
 ASSETS 7,114 0.342 0.087 0.805 -0.533 2.856 
All variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 4 Panel regression for the determinants of compensation using model (1) 
Dependent Variable Predicted LnCOMBComp LnNEDComp LnCHAIRComp 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Economic determinants     
LnMktCap + 0.163*** 
(11.68) 
0.164*** 
(11.33) 
0.172*** 
(9.41) 
LnSub + 0.004 
(0.19) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.008 
(0.37) 
LnForSub + 0.055*** 
(2.65) 
0.050** 
(2.26) 
0.067** 
(2.52) 
MTB + -0.018** 
(-2.54) 
-0.014* 
(-1.86) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.59) 
StdRet + -0.134 
(-1.33) 
-0.160 
(-1.40) 
-0.210* 
(-1.69) 
Cur_ratio + 0.002* 
(1.89) 
0.002* 
(1.89) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
Director specific determinants     
ExecSeats + 0.045* 
(1.90) 
0.049*** 
(2.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
NEDSeats + 0.013 
(0.94) 
0.010 
(0.63) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
Connectedness + -0.126** 
(-2.15) 
-0.074 
(-1.20) 
-0.016 
(-0.20) 
PrNED + - - 0.041* 
(1.68) 
PrExec + - - 0.192** 
(2.42) 
Committees + 0.083*** 
(5.77) 
0.112*** 
(7.76) 
0.023** 
(2.04) 
Other determinants     
Meetings + 0.005** 
(2.31) 
0.005* 
(1.92) 
0.006** 
(2.21) 
SubSH - -0.006 
(-1.01) 
-0.010 
(-1.45) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
Other control variables     
IAROA + -0.236*** 
(-4.92) 
-0.196*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.316*** 
(-5.10) 
DualCEOChair - -0.123** 
(-1.97) 
-0.057 
(-0.85) 
-0.095 
(-0.73) 
BoardComp - -0.428*** 
(-5.12) 
-0.444*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.062 
(-0.58) 
ChairIndicator + 0.117*** 
(2.71) 
- - 
Constant  7.496*** 
(25.59) 
7.272*** 
(24.24) 
8.089*** 
(18.01) 
Firm years (firms)  8,737(1,621) 8,509 (1,607) 6,505 (1,397) 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.6363 0.5993 0.7004 
F Value  28.62*** 27.25*** 16.45*** 
This table presents fixed effects panel regressions (grouped by firm) of NED, chairperson and combined 
compensation on various economic, director-specific and other determinants. The regressions include year 
and industry indicator variables.  Standard errors are clustered by firm and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence levels. 
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Table 3- Determinants of compensation by year 
Table 5 OLS regression for the determinants of combined compensation (LnCOMBComp) by year 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Economic determinants           
LnMktCap + 0.215*** 
(8.85) 
0.212*** 
(9.32) 
0.229*** 
(10.61) 
0.221*** 
(10.50) 
0.231*** 
(10.76) 
0.227*** 
(13.98) 
0.225*** 
(13.16) 
0.223*** 
(14.87) 
0.195*** 
(13.26) 
LnSub + 0.074** 
(2.02) 
0.027 
(0.65) 
0.069** 
(2.02) 
0.069** 
(2.09) 
0.089*** 
(2.77) 
0.089*** 
(3.20) 
0.075** 
(2.34) 
0.048** 
(2.02) 
0.058*** 
(2.73) 
LnForSub + 0.050 
(1.39) 
0.125*** 
(3.27) 
0.053* 
(1.68) 
0.027 
(0.92) 
-0.015 
(-0.54) 
-0.025 
(-1.01) 
-0.014 
(-0.46) 
0.015 
(0.62) 
0.056*** 
(2.59) 
MTB + -0.026 
(-1.33) 
-0.012 
(-0.72) 
-0.026* 
(-1.69) 
0.012 
(0.91) 
-0.029 
(-1.64) 
-0.034** 
(-2.27) 
-0.014 
(-0.46) 
-0.028* 
(-1.84) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.41) 
StdRet + -0.487 
(-1.30) 
-0.102 
(-0.28) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
-0.125 
(-0.41) 
0.207 
(0.69) 
0.412* 
(1.88) 
0.630*** 
(2.71) 
0.559** 
(2.18) 
0.243 
(1.02) 
Cur_ratio + -0.004 
(-1.23) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
0.001 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
0.003 
(1.39) 
0.001 
(0.52) 
-0.005 
(-0.42) 
-0.022* 
(-1.79) 
Director specific determinants           
ExecSeats_COMB + 0.068 
(0.81) 
0.030 
(0.51) 
0.059 
(1.00) 
0.075** 
(2.08) 
0.122*** 
(3.12) 
0.121*** 
(3.27) 
0.077** 
(1.91) 
0.035 
(1.47) 
0.057** 
(2.25) 
NEDSeats_COMB + 0.020 
(0.64) 
0.013 
(0.44) 
0.043 
(1.28) 
-0.013 
(-0.48) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
-0.015 
(-0.75) 
-0.026 
(-1.13) 
0.013 
(0.67) 
0.026 
(1.25) 
Connectedness_COMB + 0.045 
(0.43) 
-0.036 
(-0.27) 
0.045 
(0.42) 
0.173 
(1.44) 
0.071 
(0.66) 
0.155** 
(2.15) 
0.240** 
(2.03) 
0.196*** 
(2.81) 
0.186* 
(1.75) 
Committees_COMB + 0.084** 
(2.41) 
0.040 
(1.45) 
0.063*** 
(2.68) 
0.042** 
(1.98) 
0.029 
(1.15) 
0.070*** 
(3.98) 
0.076*** 
(3.55) 
0.110*** 
(5.95) 
0.103*** 
(5.49) 
Other determinants           
Meetings + 0.016** 
(2.47) 
0.018*** 
(3.07) 
0.024*** 
(4.12) 
0.019*** 
(3.54) 
0.016*** 
(3.43) 
0.007* 
(1.90) 
0.008** 
(2.02) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
0.010** 
(2.50) 
SubSH - 0.010 
(0.54) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.004 
(0.25) 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
0.016 
(1.18) 
0.007 
(0.61) 
0.005 
(0.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.42) 
-0.022* 
(-1.79) 
           
IAROA + -0.226* 
(-1.70) 
-0.283** 
(-2.55) 
-0.547*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.487*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.366*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.139* 
(-1.75) 
-0.340*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.236*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.285*** 
(-3.81) 
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Other control 
variables 
          
DualCEOChair - -0.336* 
(-1.90) 
-0.180 
(-1.58) 
-0.228* 
(-1.71) 
-0.348*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.131 
(-1.22) 
-0.255** 
(-2.35) 
-0.219** 
(-2.07) 
-0.286** 
(-2.37) 
-0.087 
(-0.80) 
BoardComp - -0.567*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.520*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.397** 
(-2.05) 
-0.559*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.391** 
(-2.54) 
-0.617*** 
(-4.97) 
-0.507*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.437*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.442*** 
(-3.58) 
ChairIndicator + 0.254*** 
(2.86) 
0.190*** 
(2.62) 
0.164** 
(2.07) 
0.165** 
(2.40) 
0.150** 
(2.24) 
0.152*** 
(2.80) 
0.138** 
(2.35) 
0.136** 
(2.28) 
0.183*** 
(3.40) 
Constant  6.486*** 
(13.12) 
5.403*** 
(11.58) 
5.833*** 
(11.98) 
5.885*** 
(9.94) 
6.857*** 
(10.07) 
6.787 
(22.71) 
7.280*** 
(9.52) 
6.680*** 
(19.91) 
7.159*** 
(13.99) 
Firm  603 680 800 945 1,115 1,138 1,095 1,191 1,170 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.4328 0.4122 0.3786 0.3868 0.3001 0.4104 0.3183 0.3617 0.3536 
F Value  23.30*** 20.04*** 23.31*** 26.41*** 27.72*** 39.08*** 21.43*** 37.93*** 26.10*** 
This table presents OLS regressions of combined NED and chairperson compensation on various economic, director-specific and other determinants separately for each 
year of our sample. The regressions include industry indicator variables and standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. 
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Table 6 Panel regression for the determinants of the premium in chairperson compensation 
Variable Predicted Coefficient t-stat 
Economic determinants    
LnMktCap + 0.023 0.65 
LnSub + 0.049 0.94 
LnForSub + -0.063 -1.15 
MTB + -0.016 -0.86 
StdRet + 0.397 1.49 
Cur_ratio + -0.002 -0.78 
Director specific 
determinants 
   
ExecSeats_NED - -0.075* -1.69 
ExecSeats_CHAIR + 0.121 1.47 
NEDSeats_NED - -0.039 -0.95 
NEDSeats_CHAIR + -0.002 -0.09 
PrNED + 0.203*** 3.30 
PrExec + 0.666*** 3.91 
Connectedness_NED - 0.052 0.30 
Connectedness_CHAIR + -0.077 -0.29 
Committees_NED - -0.287*** -7.66 
Committees_CHAIR + 0.105*** 4.22 
Other determinants    
Meetings + 0.013** 2.26 
SubSH - 0.024 1.43 
Other control variables    
IAROA + -0.313*** -2.75 
DualCEOChair + -0.104 -0.43 
BoardComp - 1.066*** 4.51 
Constant  0.106 0.12 
Firm years (firms)  6,646 (1,424)  
Adjusted R-squared  0.4208  
F Value  4.55***  
This table presents a fixed effects panel regression (grouped by firm) of the premium paid to the chairperson on various 
economic, director-specific and other determinants. The regressions include year and industry dummies and are 
estimated.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. All variables are defined in Table 1.  The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. 
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Table 7 Panel regression of changes in compensation 
Panel A Changes in cash compensation        
Dependent variable Predicted COMB 
CASHCOMP 
NED 
CASHCOMP 
CHAIR 
CASHCOMP 
COMB 
CASHCOMP 
NED 
CASHCOMP 
CHAIR 
CASHCOMP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MKTADJRETt-1 ? 0.053*** 
(3.43) 
0.057*** 
(3.13) 
0.045*** 
(5.81) 
- - - 
IAROAt-1 ? - - - -0.019 
(-0.38) 
-0.010 
(-0.17) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
 ASSETSt-1 + 0.042*** 
(3.00) 
0.052*** 
(3.23) 
0.020*** 
(2.93) 
0.058*** 
(4.02) 
0.068*** 
(4.21) 
0.033*** 
(4.85) 
Constant  -0.056 
(-0.16) 
0.044 
(0.11) 
-0.199 
(-1.41) 
-0.054 
(-0.11) 
0.050 
(0.12) 
-0.206 
(-1.45) 
Firm years (firms)  5,640 (1,296) 5,482 (1,287) 2,634 (869) 5,640 (1,296) 5,482 (1,287) 2,634 (869) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1671 0.1716 0.3781 0.1643 0.1693 0.3740 
F-value  3.01*** 2.68***  3.01**** 2.68***  
Wald Chi-squared    109.67***   74.07*** 
Panel B Changes in total compensation        
Dependent variable Predicted COMB 
COMP 
NED 
COMP 
CHAIR 
COMP 
COMB 
COMP 
NED 
COMP 
CHAIR 
COMP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MKTADJRETt-1 ? 0.090*** 
(3.52) 
0.089*** 
(3.26) 
0.069*** 
(4.80) 
- - - 
IAROAt-1 ? - - - 0.067 
(0.84) 
0.035 
(0.39) 
-0.011 
(-0.33) 
 ASSETSt-1 + 0.025 
(0.74) 
0.38 
(1.09) 
-0.008 
(-0.61) 
0.044* 
(1.86) 
0.055** 
(2.17) 
0.012 
(1.01) 
Constant  0.061 
(0.08) 
0.129 
(0.21) 
-0.309 
(-1.18) 
0.100 
(0.13) 
0.159 
(0.27) 
-0.314 
(-1.19) 
Firm years (firms)  5,640 (1,296) 5,482 (1,287) 2,634 (869) 5,640 (1,296) 5,482 (1,287) 2,634 (869) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1656 0.1706 0.3207 0.1626 0.1681 0.3170 
F-value  4.29*** 3.32***  3.83*** 2.68***  
Wald Chi-squared    90.28***   66.73*** 
This table presents regressions of the change in NED, chairperson and combined compensation on firm performance and the change in assets. The regressions include year and industry indicator 
variables. The panel regressions are estimated using fixed effects (COMBCOMP and NEDCOMP) (grouped by firm) or random effects (CHAIRCOMP).  Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels. 
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